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Abstract—Because of the open nature of the Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN), the Denial of the Service (DoS) becomes one
of the most serious threats to the stability of the resource-
constrained sensor nodes. In this paper, we develop AccFlow
which is an incrementally deployable Software-Defined Network-
ing based protocol that is able to serve as a countermeasure
against the low-rate TCP DoS attack. The main idea of AccFlow
is to make the attacking flows accountable for the congestion by
dropping their packets according to their loss rates. The larger
their loss rates, the more aggressively AccFlow drops their pack-
ets. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that AccFlow
can effectively defend against the low-rate TCP DoS attack even
if attackers vary their strategies by attacking at different scales
and data rates. Furthermore, while AccFlow is designed to solve
the low-rate TCP DoS attack, we demonstrate that AccFlow can
also effectively defend against general DoS attacks which do not
rely on the TCP retransmission timeout mechanism but cause
denial of service to legitimate users by consistently exhausting the
network resources. Finally, we consider the scalability of AccFlow
and its deployment in real networks.
Keywords—Wireless Sensor Networks, DoS attack, Software-
Defined Networking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a powerful network of
widely distributed sensing, computing, storage and communi-
cation [1], [2]. As WSN promises to bring immense values
to our daily life, it also opens a door to many challenges.
The open nature, low computation capacity and limited battery
power often make WSN susceptible to the to many threats
[3]. One of the emerging attack is the “Low-rate TCP DoS
Attack”, in which attackers launch DoS attack by exploiting
TCP retransmission timeout mechanism [4]. To launch such
an attack, the attackers set up periodic on-off “square-wave”
traffic whose peak transmission rate is large enough to exhaust
the network bandwidth. When attacked, the legitimate TCP
flows experience severe packet losses and enter retransmission
timeouts. If the period of the attacking flow is close to the
retransmission timeouts, the legitimate TCP flows will face
another peak when they are trying to recover from the timeouts.
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As a result, they again suffer from severe packet losses and
are forced to enter even longer retransmission timeouts. The
cycle repeats and the legitimate TCP flows are throttled to
nearly zero throughput. Compared to the general DoS attacks
in which malicious users cause denial of service to legitimate
users by sending continuous high rate flows rather than relying
on the TCP retransmission timeout mechanism, time-averaged
bandwidth usage of the low-rate TCP DoS attacking flow is
small, even much less than the total available bandwidth. This
is why we call such an attack the low-rate TCP DoS attack.
Another interesting characteristic for the low-rate TCP DoS
attacking flow is that its periodic traffic pattern is similar to
that of the legitimate TCP periodic traffic such as the video
traffic that adopts the DASH [5] standard. In spite of the similar
traffic pattern, the fundamental difference between the benign
TCP periodic flow and the low-rate TCP DoS attacking flow
is that the former backs off by entering retransmission timeout
when its packets are lost whereas the latter does not.
Although the low-rate TCP DoS attack has been proposed
for nearly ten years, it has not been fully addressed. Sun et
al. [6] use signal processing (autocorrelation of the traffic)
to detect the periodic burst attack at the congested router.
Whenever attacks have been detected, the router traces back to
its upstream routers to find the attack source. Such a solution
may not work if the congested router has multiple upstream
routers so that the bursty traffic it detects consists of the
aggregate traffic from these upstream routers. Therefore, it is
possible that the upstream routers cannot detect the bursty
attacking traffic which stops the tracing back process. The
work by Chang et al. [7] addresses this problem by assigning
high priorities to the packets which are destined to high
loss rate TCP application ports. However, such a defense
mechanism can be breached if the attackers send large volumes
of traffic to a specific protected port to cause a high loss
rate at this port. Consequently, the attackers’ traffic will be
marked as high priority traffic. Furthermore, because both of
the aforementioned solutions target merely on the ideal low-
rate TCP DoS attack, one alternative strategy for attackers to
crack the defense could be splitting their traffic into multiple
attacking flows to trigger distributed DoS attacks. Also they
do not illustrate how their defending protocols will impact
the benign periodic flows such as the aforementioned video
traffic. In this paper, we develop the AccFlow (representing
Accountable Flow) protocol which effectively defends against
the low-rate TCP DoS attack without causing any performance
degradation to the benign periodic flows. Furthermore, Ac-
cFlow also provides a strong defense against the general DoS
or DDoS attacks.
Different from previous literatures, we incorporate the con-
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cept of the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [8] and flow
accountability when designing AccFlow. The SDN architec-
ture, in which the centralized controller makes the decision
of packet routing and forwarding so that it can explicitly
execute different policies to different flows, is proposed to
provide flexibility and novelty to configure the network. For
instance, one of the benefits for such a centralized architecture
is that network operators are able to coordinate the traffic to
build low latency and congestion free networks, especially data
center networks [9] [10]. Although not proposed for solving
security problems in computer networking, the concept of SDN
provides novel ways to rethink and address such problems
[11]. Specifically, with the centralized network architecture,
the controller is capable to do online traffic monitoring and
analysis. Whenever attacking flows are detected, it blocks
them and saves the network resources for legitimate flows.
The advantages of such SDN-based defending techniques are
twofold. Firstly, it responds to attacks in realtime. Secondly,
it immediately benefits the deployed routers or Autonomous
Systems (ASes) because it does not rely on reconfiguration
at other parts of the network. In spite of the aforementioned
advantages, flow-based security protocols need to be scalable
to deal with huge numbers of attacking flows, especially when
we consider to deploy the protocols in Wide Area Networks
(WANs). In this paper, we propose to use flow aggregation1
and virtual centralized controller2 to solve the scalability
problem so that our protocol can be deployed in both Local
Area Networks (LANs) and WANs.
The reason why the low-rate TCP DoS attack and other
kinds of DoS attacks work well is that whenever a congestion
happens, the router drops the packets from all flows regardless
of who cause the congestion. In other words, accountability
for the congestion is not considered for packets dropping [12].
Consequently, legitimate TCP flows which strictly comply
with the congestion avoidance protocol and transmit at rea-
sonable rates are equally blamed on the congestion although
it is caused by attacking flows which send large volumes
of traffic and exhaust the network bandwidth. Therefore, in
order to effectively tackle the DoS attacks, AccFlow takes
into consideration the accountability for congestions when
dropping packets. Specifically, the more accountable the flows
are for the congestion, the more aggressively AccFlow drops
their packets. We associate each flow’s accountability for the
congestion to its loss rate. The higher its loss rate, the more
accountable it is for the congestion. The reason is that attacking
flows, who are more accountable for the congestion, are always
featured with high loss rates since they have to keep sending
excessive numbers of packets so as to overflow the network.
However, it is relatively rare for the legitimate TCP flows,
who are less accountable for the congestion, to suffer from
consistently high loss rates because they will reduce their
transmission rates and even enter timeouts when their packets
are dropped. Therefore, the loss rate of a flow is positively
1We use source IP address-based flow aggression. The detailed explanation
is in subsections IV-B and V-A.
2The concept of virtual centralized controller is that we use multiple
coordinated processors to serve as the centralized controller. The details are
in subsection V-B.
correlated to its accountability for the congestion. AccFlow
protects the network by dropping packets from higher loss rate
flows with higher probabilities whereas dropping packets from
lower loss rate flows with lower probabilities.
Through substantial amounts of simulations on ns-3 [13],
we demonstrate that AccFlow can effectively defend against
both the low-rate TCP DoS attack and general DoS attacks. In
summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
• AccFlow is the first SDN-based security protocol that
considers flow accountability when defending against
DoS or DDoS attacks.
• We demonstrate that AccFlow, which does not cause any
performance degradation to benign flows, can effectively
defend against both the low-rate TCP DoS attack and
general DoS attacks even if attackers are able to vary
their strategies.
• We use flow aggregation and virtual centralized con-
troller to solve the scalability problem of AccFlow and
make it deployable in real networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we give a brief introduction to the low-rate TCP DoS
attack. In section III, we elaborate on the AccFlow protocol. In
section IV, we thoroughly study the effectiveness of AccFlow
in different simulation settings. In section V, we consider the
deployment of AccFlow in real networks and its interaction
with other security protocols. Finally, we conclude in section
VI.
II. LOW-RATE TCP DOS ATTACK
In this section we briefly introduce the low-rate TCP DoS
attack and its effectiveness to cause denial of service to legit-
imate TCP flows. The ideal low-rate TCP DoS attacking flow
can be represented by a triple {R,P,D}, where R indicates
the peak data rate, P indicates the attacking period and D
indicates the burst duration within one period, as illustrated in
Figure 1(a). In order to overflow the network, R needs to be
larger than the bottleneck link bandwidth. P should be small
enough, compared to the RTTs of legitimate TCP flows, to
attack most of the traversing flows. D is negatively correlated
to R if the amount of traffic generated by the attackers in one
period is fixed. A detailed discussion on the choice of R, P
and D can be found in [4].
We set up simulations on ns-3 platform to illustrate the
effectiveness of low-rate TCP DoS attack. We create a “dumb-
bell” network topology whose bottleneck link bandwidth is
10Mbps, as illustrated in Figure 1(b). In this simulation setup,
9 legitimate TCP flows and one attacking flow are traversing
the bottleneck link. We configure the network so that each
legitimate TCP flow is transmitting at 1Mbps and the attacking
flow triple {R,P,D} is {30Mbps, 200ms, 67ms}. Note that
we scale down the bottleneck link bandwidth and flow rates in
order to accelerate the simulation. As illustrated in Figure 2(a),
without being attacked, all legitimate TCP flows fairly share
the bottleneck link bandwidth and achieve their desired data
rates. However, they are throttled to nearly zero throughput
under attack, as illustrated Figure 2(b). Note that the time-
averaged data rate of the attacking flow (around 3.5Mbps)
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TABLE I: Simulation Settings.
Simulation Setting Legitimate TCP Flows Attack Scales Aggregate Attacking Rate
Setting One 5 flows with same rate 1Mbps 1 to 50 attacking flows 30Mbps
Setting Two 9 flows with different rates ranging from 0.3Mbps to 1.1Mbps 1 to 50 attacking flows 30Mbps
Setting Three 9 flows with different rates ranging from 0.3Mbps to 1.1Mbps 5 attacking flows 20Mbps to 60Mbps
R
P D
(a) Low-rate TCP DoS attacking flow.
Server
Bottleneck Link
10Mbps
Legitimate User Attacker
(b) Network topology.
Fig. 1: Attacking traffic and network topology.
is far less than the bottleneck link bandwidth. Therefore,
attackers use much less resources to achieve very effective
DoS attacks.
III. ACCFLOW DESIGN
In this section, we elaborate on AccFlow. AccFlow is a
transport layer protocol that is deployed on the SDN central-
ized controller. The controller monitors all traversing flows,
conducts flow analysis and then instructs the switches or
routers to execute different routing and forwarding policies to
different flows. We illustrated the architecture of AccFlow in
Figure 6. AccFlow includes two major modules, i.e., Aggres-
sive Detection and Early Drop. Aggressive Detection is used
to block the attacking flows that are behaving aggressively
enough to be detected whereas Early Drop is used to protect
the network when attackers try to evade detection by smartly
varying their attacking strategies.
A. Aggressive Detection
In order to detect the attacking flows, we need to find unique
features that distinguish them from legitimate ones. Since
the attackers consistently generate high volumes of traffic to
overflow the network, the loss rates of their flows (the ratio of
lost packets over total transmitted packets) are supposed to be
higher than the legitimate flows. Therefore, a straightforward
way to differentiate legitimate flows and attacking flows is
using loss rate. To verify the effectiveness of this intuitive
solution, we study the loss rate of each flow in the simulation
conducted in the previous section. The centralized controller
monitors the traffic and periodically conducts statistical anal-
ysis for all traversing flows. The controller’s flow analysis
period should be two or three times of the typical RTTs of
the traversing flows so that on one hand the controller can
accurately learn the behaviors of the traversing flows and
on the other hand it can react to attacks very fast. In our
simulation, we set the period to be 0.5s, which is about two
times of the typical RTTs of the traversing flows. In the rest
of the paper, we use the term detection period to indicate
the controller’s analysis period. The simulation results are
illustrated in Figure 7(a).
It is clear that the loss rate of the attacking flow is consis-
tently high. However, the loss rates for some legitimate flows
in some detection periods are even higher. Therefore, purely
relying on loss rate to detect the attacking flow may result
in false detection. After analyzing the traffic sending by each
flow, we realize that the loss rate for a legitimate flow in one
detection period is high because it only sends one packet in that
detection period and the only packet is dropped. Specifically,
after packet losses, the legitimate flow backs off and waits for
one retransmission timeout before entering the TCP slow start
process. At the beginning of slow start, it sends out one packet
to probe the available bandwidth. If the network is extremely
congested, it is highly possible that the newly generated packet
is dropped. If so, the legitimate flow is forced to enter an even
longer retransmission timeout. This explains why the loss rate
of a legitimate flow is either 1 (the only packet is dropped)
or 0 (waiting in retransmission timeout). As for the attacking
flow, it consistently sends out huge numbers of packets and
never backs off even though a lot of the precedent packets
were dropped. Therefore, the attacking flow has a consistently
high loss rate.
In our framework, we propose to use Uniform Loss Rate
(ULR) which is the product of the loss rate and usage rate
to differentiate the attacking flow from legitimate flows. The
usage rate of one flow is the ratio of the number of its
transmitted packets in one detection period over the total
number of arriving packets from all flows in this detection
period. The attacking flow is featured with high ULR since it
has to consistently send large numbers of packets (high usage
rate) and never backs off even if its packets are dropped (high
loss rate). As illustrated in Figure 7(b), there is a notable
gap between the ULR of the attacking flow and legitimate
flows. Therefore, ULR is an effective feature to leverage to
differentiate the attacking flow from legitimate ones. Whenever
detecting a flow with excessively high ULR whereas other
flows’ ULRs are close to zero, the centralized controller will
identify it as an attacking flow and completely blocks its traffic.
Although simple and accurate when defending against the
ideal low-rate TCP DoS attack, Aggressive Detection requires
a large enough ULR gap to differentiate between the attacking
flow and legitimate flows. Finding such a reasonable ULR
threshold is difficult, especially when attackers vary their
strategies to reduce the ULRs of their flows. For example,
instead of launching one attacking flow, attackers can split their
traffic into N flows and synchronize them to create the periodic
burst flow. The usage rate of each individual attacking flow will
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reduce by N−1N percentage, so does its ULR. As the number of
synchronized attacking flows increases, the ULR gaps between
legitimate flows and attacking flows decrease, which makes
it difficult for the controller to detect the attacking flows.
However, since the network still experiences the same amount
of attacking traffic, the DoS attack will continue to be effective.
We present the shortcoming of Aggressive Detection in Figure
8. Note that when the attackers split their traffic into 50
synchronized flows, the ULR differences between attacking
flows and legitimate flows are close to zero. To tackle such
distributed attacks, we design the Early Drop module in the
next subsection.
B. Early Drop
Early Drop is proposed to effectively deal with the afore-
mentioned distributed attacks. The design of Early Drop is also
based on the consistent flow monitoring and periodic flow anal-
ysis by the centralized controller. However, Early Drop does
not purely rely on the ULR to detect attacking flows. In fact,
Early Drop is a heuristic algorithm illustrated in Algorithm 1
that conducts flow-based packet dropping according to each
flow’s loss rate without explicitly detecting attacking flows.
Next, we elaborate on the Early Drop algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Early Drop
1 if the beginning of kth detection period then
2 Calculate the aggregate loss rate L;
3 for each traversing flow Fi do
4 Calculate its usage Ui and loss rate Li;
5 if L > Th1 then
6 for each arriving packet do
7 Find the flow Fj it belongs to;
8 if Uj > Th2 then
9 if Lj > 0.5× L then
10 Drop the packet with probability Lj ;
11 else if Npacket > Th3 then
12 Drop the packet with probability Lj ;
The algorithm is executed in every detection period. The first
4 lines of the code are executed only once at the beginning
of each detection period whereas the rest lines of the code are
executed whenever a packet arrives in this detection period.
The aggregate loss rate L (line 2) is the ratio of the number
of dropped packets from all flows in the previous detection
period to the total number of arriving packets in the previous
detection period. Similarly, usage Ui of flow Fi (line 4) is
the number of packets sent by Fi in the previous detection
period. Loss rate Li of Fi (line 4) is the ratio of the number
of dropped packets from Fi in the previous detection period to
Ui. Note that all these values L, Ui and Li used in the current
detection period are calculated based on the statistics obtained
in the previous detection period. If the current detection period
is the first detection period, the controller initializes all these
values to be zero. All these values remain the same in this
detection period and will be updated at the beginning of the
next detection period. The rest lines of the codes, from line 5
to the end, conduct the packet dropping policy according to
these values.
We add a condition L > Th1 in line 5 for packet dropping.
This is because Early Drop starts dropping packets even before
the network bandwidth is exhausted. Therefore, it is necessary
to make sure that the network is being attacked before applying
such an aggressive dropping policy. In other words, Early Drop
is a self protective mechanism which automatically begins
dropping packets when the network shows a sign of being
attacked. We use aggregate loss rate to verify whether the
network is being attacked or not for the following reasons.
Legitimate TCP flows comply with the congestion avoidance
protocol and back off when their packets are lost due to
severe congestion. Thus, even though they have large original
transmission rates, they will tailor their actual data rates to
suit the available bandwidth. Therefore, it is rare for the
network to witness a consistently high aggregate loss rate
under normal situations. However, when attackers are trying to
cause denial of service to legitimate flows by exhausting the
network bandwidth, they have to continuously generate traffic
even though many of their packets are dropped, i.e., they never
back off when supposed to do so. As a result, the network
will experience a very high aggregate loss rate under attack.
We verify our analysis by studying the aggregate loss rate in
both normal and attacked scenarios. The experimental results,
illustrated in Figure 3, show that even 40 legitimate flows
each with original 1Mbps transmission rate are traversing the
10Mbps bottleneck link, the aggregate loss rate is well bellow
10 percentage.3 However, when the attackers are trying to
launch attack, the aggregate loss rate is more than 65%. Thus,
aggregate loss rate is an effective feature to indicate whether
the network is under DoS attack or not. The network operators
can have different configurations for the threshold Th1 based
on their own policies and traffic characteristics. For instance,
if they want to aggressively protect their network, they need
to set a relatively low threshold for Th1 and vice versa.
The main idea of the Early Drop algorithm is that it
drops the packets from accountable flows with reasonable
probabilities. By “accountable”, we mean that Early Drop only
blames the flows who are accountable for the congestion. By
“reasonable”, we mean that Early Drop drops the packets of
accountable flows according to their loss rates. We achieve
accountability by line 8 of the algorithm. In particular, if a flow
only sends one or two packets during one detection period,
it is not accountable for the congestion so that Early Drop
will not drop its packets. We add the threshold Th2 to make
sure that Early Drop will not falsely blame the legitimate TCP
flows who have just recovered from retransmission timeouts
and send one packet in the beginning of the TCP slow start
process to probe the available bandwidth. Th2 should be
small and increases with the duration of the detection period
3The real network is always bandwidth over-provisioned to tolerate the
traffic burst caused by legitimate flows, which makes it rare for the network
to have a large aggregate loss rate under normal situation.
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since a longer detection period may contain more TCP slow
start processes. We set Th2 as 5 in our simulations when
we test the effectiveness of AccFlow in the next section.
Furthermore, we accomplish reasonability by considering its
loss rate while dropping packets from a particular flow (lines
9 to 12). Specifically, Early drop divides all flows into two
groups, i.e., high loss rate group and low loss rate group.
All flows whose loss rates are above half of the aggregate
loss rate L will be categorized into the high loss rate group
and Early drop immediately drops their packets according to
their loss rates. On the contrary, flows whose loss rates are
no greater than half of the L will be assigned to the low loss
rate group and Early Drop applies packet dropping to these
flows only when the number of queueing packets Npacket in
the router is larger than Th3. The threshold Th3 is used to
indicate that the network is slightly congested so that it is
positively related to the router’s buffer size. We set Th3 to be
10% of the router’s buffer size in our simulations. Again the
network operators can have different configurations for Th3
according to their policies. To sum up, Early Drop blames
the flows that are accountable for the congestion and the
higher their loss rates, the more aggressively it drops their
packets. The fundamental difference between Early Drop and
other Active Queue Management disciplines such as RED
and WRED is that Early Drop selectively drops packets from
more accountable flows (often the attacking flows) early before
the router buffer is exhausted so that the packets from less
accountable flows (often the legitimate flows) can be enqueued.
However, RED and WRED simply drop all arriving packets
when the buffer is full so that the legitimate flows will suffer
from denial of service.
Note that we can use Aggressive Detection as a patch to
Early Drop. In particular, Early Drop is always active to
protect the network whereas Aggressive Detection will be
applied to completely block the attacking flows if they perform
aggressively enough to be detected by the controller. In the
next section, we thoroughly test the effectiveness of AccFlow
through substantial amounts of simulations.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF ACCFLOW
In this section, we thoroughly study the effectiveness of
AccFlow on ns-3 platform in four major simulation setups.
We use the network topology illustrated in Figure 1(b) in all
simulation setups whereas the traversing flows are different
under different setups.4 The first setup regards the distributed
low-rate TCP DoS attack, in which we consider different
types of legitimate traffic and different attacking strategies.
The second setup is about another DoS attack derived from the
low-rate TCP DoS attack. We call it Short Selfish TCP Flow
(SSTF) attack because the attackers selfishly consume nearly
the whole network resources by generating excessive numbers
of short TCP flows. The third setup is designed to verify
that AccFlow does not falsely drop packets from legitimate
periodic flows. Finally, we consider the general DoS attacks
in the fourth setup.
4AccFlow is not limited to the simple dumbbell network topology. It is
effective to protect both the inter-domain and intra-domain traffic.
A. Distributed Low-Rate TCP DoS Attack
In this setup, we design three different simulation settings.
In setting one, we have 5 legitimate TCP flows each with
1Mbps transmission rate. The attackers are able to launch
different scales of distributed attacks by splitting their traffic
into different numbers of synchronized subflows, ranging from
1 from 50.5 The aggregate attacking rate of all these synchro-
nized attacking flows is about 30Mbps, which is three times
of the bottleneck link bandwidth. The attacking period P is
200ms and attacking duration D in one period is 67ms. In
setting two, we use the same attacking traffic as that of setting
one but we have 9 legitimate TCP flows each with a different
transmission rate, ranging from 0.3Mpbs to 1.1Mpbs. The
reason why we have both setting one and setting two is that
TCP uses the Max-min fairness [14], where the network first
satisfies the flows with smaller demands (lower transmission
rates) and then evenly distributes the bandwidth to flows with
larger demands if the network resources are limited. As a
result, in a congested network, flows with smaller transmission
rates can get their fair bandwidth shares more easily than flows
with higher rates. Therefore, we need to consider both the
two settings in our simulation. In the third setting, we test
the effectiveness of Accountable when attackers are varying
their attacking rates from 20Mbps to 60Mbps. Without loss
of generality, we assume that attackers split their traffic into 5
attacking flows in this setting and we use the same legitimate
TCP traffic as that of the setting two. We summarize the three
simulation settings in Table I.
The simulation results are illustrated Figure 4. Figure 4(a)
illustrates the results for setting one when five 1Mbps legiti-
mate TCP flows are traversing the network. Since the whole
bandwidth of the bottleneck link is 10Mbps, which is large
enough to hold all the legitimate traffic, all the 5 flows should
not experience any packet losses6 and achieve their ideal
throughput when they are not attacked. As we can see in
Figure 4(a), AccFlow can effectively protect the legitimate
flows from being attacked since the average throughput of
the legitimate flows is close to the desired transmission rate.
Furthermore, the performance of AccFlow does not degrade as
the number of attacking flows increases. Figure 4(b) illustrates
the simulation results for setting two. Note that we set up 9
legitimate flows in this setting but we only plot the results for 5
of them in the figure for concise presentation. With AccFlow,
all 9 legitimate flows are able to achieve their desired data
rates even under large scales of attacks. In setting three, we
vary the aggregate attacking rates from 20Mbps to 60Mbps.
Again we plot the simulation results for 5 legitimate flows in
the figure. The results show that AccFlow can also effectively
defend the network even if attackers are able to change their
attacking rates.
Here, we make a detailed explanation for the effectiveness of
AccFlow. Consider one legitimate TCP flow and one attacking
5Note that we scale down the number of flows in order to accelerate the
simulation. As you can see in our experiment results, the performance of
AccFlow is not impacted by the scale of DDoS attacks.
6In this paper, we only consider packet losses caused by network conges-
tions.
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flow in our simulations. Assume that attackers launch DoS
attacks in detection period Tk. Due to severe packet losses
in Tk, the legitimate TCP flow envisions a heavily congested
network and enters retransmission timeout. Therefore, in the
next detection period Tk+1, either its loss rate is zero if it is still
waiting in the timeout or its usage is very low if it just recovers
from the timeout and sends small amounts of packets to probe
the available bandwidth. Under both scenarios, AccFlow will
not further blame the legitimate flow. However, the attackers
have to continuously send high volumes of traffic in order to
overflow the bottleneck link. Thus the attacking flow still has
a large usage in the next detection period Tk+1 in spite of
its high loss rate in Tk. Under such a situation, AccFlow will
early drop its packets according to its loss rate. Furthermore,
if the network is still congested after early drop, the router
itself will also drop packets since it cannot deal with so much
traffic. Therefore, the attacking flow will experience an even
larger loss rate in detection period Tk+1. This cycle repeats
so that the loss rate of the attacking flow increases in each
detection period until the network is not congested or its loss
rate equals to one. Under both scenarios, the attacking flow
can no longer harm the network.
In order to be a realtime defending technique, AccFlow
needs to react to attacks very fast. Here we study the con-
vergence time of AccFlow, i.e., how long it takes AccFlow to
clear up the attacks. We define the convergence time as the
time when all legitimate flows’ loss rates are zero. Without
loss of generality, we randomly pick up one simulation setup
in each of the three settings listed in Table I to study its
convergence time. Specifically, we test the scenarios where
attackers set up 20 and 30 attacking flows in setting one and
setting two, respectively. As for the setting three, we use the
case when attackers are generating traffic at rate of 40Mbps.
Our simulation results are illustrated in Figure 5. Under all
three scenarios, AccFlow can react to the attack quickly and
the convergence time is in the order of seconds or tens of
seconds.
As a flow-based defending technique, AccFlow needs to
be scalable to deal with large numbers of attacking flows.
Although the performance of AccFlow does not decline as
the number of attacking flows increases (as illustrated in our
simulation results), huge numbers of flows will exhaust the
CPU and storage of the centralized controller. We discuss
the scalability problem and propose our solutions in section
V where we consider the deployment of AccFlow in real
networks.
B. Short Selfish TCP Flow Attack
In this section we discuss a very effective DoS attack which
is similar to but still fundamentally different from the low-rate
TCP DoS attack. The attacking technique is that malicious
users periodically set up many short TCP flows to gain unfair
share of network resources. Specifically, the early coming short
TCP flows congest the network and cause all flows (including
both legitimate TCP flows and themselves) to enter retrans-
mission timeouts. Then the attackers selfishly start new short
TCP flows to occupy the whole network bandwidth since no
one besides attackers is transmitting now. The interesting point
of such DoS attacks is that it seems that the attackers never
deviate from the TCP protocol since these short TCP flows will
back off when their packets are lost. However, the attackers
are able to cause very severe denial of service to legitimate
users simply by breaking their traffic into small short flows. We
name such an attack the Short Selfish TCP Flow (SSTF) attack.
Note that the difference between the SSTF attack and low-rate
TCP DoS attack is that the former cannot synchronize all these
short TCP flows to create the regular periodic burst traffic since
transmitters have to wait for the ACKs before sending new
packets. We set up simulations to illustrate the effectiveness
of the SSTF attack. In our simulation we have 10 attackers and
each of them sends one short TCP flow with 3Mbps data rate
every 200ms. Furthermore, we have 9 legitimate TCP flows
with 1Mbps transmission rate each. The results, illustrated
in Figure 9, show that the SSTF attack is able to effectively
throttle the legitimate users to almost zero throughput.
Now we explain why the SSTF attack can cause such an
effective denial of service to the legitimate users even though
each individual short flow itself behaves exactly the same as
a legitimate TCP flow.7 First let us reconstruct the attacking
procedure. Assume that attackers first set up n short TCP
flows A = {A1, A2, ..., An} to cause congestion. Then all
the legitimate flows and attacking flows in A will suffer from
severe packet losses and enter retransmission timeouts. After
a short period, attackers set up another set of short TCP flows
B = {B1, B2, ..., Bm}. Since no one is transmitting now, B
will occupy the whole network resources. When the legitimate
flows try to recover from timeouts, they may face another set
of short attacking flows started by the attackers after flows in B
finish. Again, congestion happens and the legitimate flows are
forced to enter even longer retransmission timeouts. The cycle
repeats and the attackers are able to selfishly utilize nearly the
whole network resources. In a word, by sacrificing a small
fraction of their traffic, the attackers create a “clear” network
environment for most of their traffic and cause severe denial
of service to the legitimate users.
The trick played by the attackers is to evade accountability
by continuously generating fresh short flows. In particular, it
is the flows in A that cause the congestion so that we have
no reason to blame the flows in B. However, when flows in A
experience severe packet losses, the source should realize that
the network is congested and should not start new flows. Thus,
flow set B should not be generated because both A and B come
from the same source (attackers). Therefore, although each
individual short TCP flow complies with the TCP protocol,
the attackers still behave maliciously by periodically setting
up new TCP flows even though the previous flows experience
high loss rates.
We propose to use flow aggregation to defend against the
SSTF attack. Specifically, all flows with the same source
IP address will be aggregated as one flow.8 Consequently,
7Here we mean each short TCP flow complies with the TCP protocol and
will back off when a congestion happens.
8It is possible to conduct flow aggregation based on other properties such
as source IP address and application port pair. We leave the discussion of
different aggregating properties in future works.
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, VOL. X, NO. XX, 2018 7
although flow Ai ∈ A and flow Bj ∈ B are different flows,
they may have the same source IP address since they are both
generated by the attackers. As a result, AccFlow will aggregate
them as one flow. Therefore, flow Bj will be blamed for
the congestion caused by flow Ai. Similarly, the subsequent
flows will be accountable for the congestion caused by their
precedent flows as long as they have the same source IP
address. Thus, the attackers are not able to selfishly over-utilize
the network resources by creating new flows. A potential
problem for conducting such flow aggregation is that attackers
can spoof their source IP addresses to keep generating new
flows. However, the network security community has proposed
effective mechanisms such as Stackpi [15] and packet filters
[16] to prevent source IP spoofing. AccFlow can embrace
such security protocols to prevent attackers from faking flows.
Another potential problem is that the Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT) router translates the IP addresses of the hosts
within its LAN to its public IP address. Then all the flows
from different hosts will have the same source IP address after
they leave the LAN. When they reach other remote sites which
deploy AccFlow, they will be aggregated as one flow. Thus, a
single compromised host within the LAN may cause denial of
service to all the legitimate hosts within the LAN since their
flows are aggregated as the same flow. To solve the problem,
we can deploy AccFlow on the NAT router so that it will drop
the packets from the local attacking flow and save bandwidth
for legitimate flows. Therefore, the local attacking flow will
not be able to leave the LAN to attack the remote sites.
We test the effectiveness of AccFlow when the network is
faced with the SSTF attack under similar simulation settings
in Table I. As illustrated in Figure 10, Accountable Flow can
effectively defend against the SSTF attack. Note that we set
the minimum number of attacking flows to be 5 since the
SSTF attack needs to be distributed in order to be effective.
The convergence time is also in the order of seconds to tens of
seconds. We do not present the results for the convergence time
in the paper due to space constraint. Note that the achieved data
rates (throughput) for higher rate flows, i.e., ones with rates
0.9Mbps and 1.1Mbps, are slightly less than their desired data
rates. We attribute such slight performance degradation to the
fact that TCP Max-min fairness serves the low rate flows first
in congested networks.
C. Benign Periodic Flow
Real life networks, such as the Internet, also carries periodic
or bursty flows whose traffic pattern is similar to that of
the low-rate TCP DoS attacking flows. One example is that
YouTube generates periodic traffic by loading chunks of a
video with pauses between each chunk [17]. In this subsection,
we show that AccFlow does not falsely drop the packets from
benign periodic flows through the following four experiments.
In the first experimental setup, 5 normal TCP flows each
transmitting at rate 1Mbps and one benign periodic flow are
sharing the network resources. The analysis in [17] reveals
that the peak rate for a typical YouTube flow ranges from
hundreds of kilobytes to several megabytes. The interval of
each video chunk ranges from hundreds of milliseconds to
seconds. We set the peak rate and period of the periodic flow in
our simulation to be 3Mbps and 200ms so that it can represent
the real video traffic. Since the bottleneck link bandwidth is
10Mbps which is large enough to hold all the traffic, the first
setup is congestion free. In the second setup, we create a fairly
congested network by generating 9 normal TCP flows and the
same periodic flow. In the third setup, the network becomes
quite congested by carrying 15 normal TCP flows and the same
periodic flow. Finally, in the fourth setup, the network is very
congested as 20 normal TCP flows and the same periodic flow
are traversing the bottleneck link.
The simulation results are illustrated in Figure 11. For clear
presentation, we use characters “N”, “F”, “Q” and “V” to
represent words “Not”, “Fairly”, “Quite” and “Very”, respec-
tively. The character “Cg” represents the word “Congested”.
Thus “F Cg” means that the network is fairly congested, which
corresponds to the second setup. As illustrated in Figure 11(a),
the benign periodic flow achieves its desired throughput in all
these four setups no matter whether AccFlow is applied or not.
Furthermore, AccFlow also does not have any negative effect
on the normal TCP flows, as illustrated in Figure 11(b). The
results indicate that AccFlow can harmoniously coexist with
benign flows without causing any performance degradation.
The reason is that compared to attacking flows, the benign
periodic flow is not trying to overflow the congested link.
Therefore, the network will not suffer from high aggregate
loss rate. As a result, AccFlow does not apply its aggressive
dropping policy. Even though in some situations where a
legitimate bursty flow has a large enough peak rate to cause a
high aggregate loss rate so that AccFlow drops some packets,
the negative effect does not propagate since legitimate flows
will back off by entering retransmission timeouts after the
packet losses. As a result, the network will become less
congested and the aggregate loss rate will drop below the
threshold Th1.
D. General (D)DoS Attack
Although designed to solve the low-rate TCP DoS attack,
AccFlow can also serve as the defending technique for general
DoS attacks. The difference between the low-rate TCP DoS
attack and the general DoS attacks is that the former has to
rely on the TCP retransmission timeout mechanism to launch
attacks whereas the latter causes denial of service to the
legitimate users simply by sending large volumes of traffic. As
aforementioned, the core idea of AccFlow is to make attacking
flows accountable for the congestion by early dropping their
packets according to their loss rates. Therefore, any attacking
flows that are accountable for the congestion are not able to
cause denial of service to the legitimate flows by over-utilizing
network resources. In fact, the reason why AccFlow is effective
to deal with the general DoS attacks is that we do not leverage
on the periodic nature of the low-rate TCP DoS attacking flows
while designing the algorithm.
To test the effectiveness of AccFlow when the network is
faced with the general DoS attacks, we use similar simulation
settings listed in Table I except that the attackers consistently
generate traffic without pause. As illustrated in Figure 12, Ac-
cFlow can effectively defend against the general DoS attacks.
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Furthermore, AccFlow also has quick convergence time under
such attacks, which is in the order of tens of seconds.
V. DEPLOYMENT OF ACCFLOW
In this section, we consider the interaction of AccFlow with
other security protocols and its deployment in real networks.
Although the SDN-based security protocol has its advantages,
such as flexible control and realtime reaction to attacks, it also
has several potential problems. One of the major challenges is
the scalability issue due to the centralized network architecture.
Since the centralized controller needs to create an entry in
the routing table for each distinct flow, huge numbers of
distinct flows will exhaust its the CPU and storage resources.
In this paper, we propose to use flow aggregation and virtual
centralized controller to solve the scalability problem.
A. Flow Aggregation
Recall that we aggregate flows according to their source IP
addresses to deal with the SSTF attack in subsection IV-B. In
fact, by using the aforementioned security protocols to deal
with source IP spoofing, flow aggregation can also prevent the
attackers from amplifying their attacking scale by faking huge
numbers of flows. Furthermore, with protocols like ingress
filter [18] and Passport [19], ASes can limit the range of their
acceptable source IP addresses. As a result, the number of
distinct attacking flows that can be used to attack the bottleneck
link is limited. Moreover, the existing security protocols, such
as MiddlePolice [20], [21], Mirage [22], Phalanx [23], Push-
back [24] and DoS-limiting architecture [25], can be applied
to further limit the attacking scales. For instance, Mirage
adopts the concept of frequency hopping in wireless networks
to “hop” the destination IP addresses among all available
addresses. Each time a user wants to send traffic to this site, it
has to solve a computational puzzle to get the new IP address,
which will limit the volumes of traffic that the computationally
limited attackers can send. MiddlePolice, on the other head,
allows the destination to determine which source IPs are
allowed through self-defined traffic control policies. Since
AccFlow does not cause disruption to the existing network
infrastructure, it can effectively interact with these security
protocols to defend the network against extremely large scale
DDoS attacks.
B. Virtual Centralized Controller
In order to deal with large numbers of flows, we can
also adopt the concept of virtual centralized SDN controller.
Specifically, multiple processors can serve as the conceptual
centralized controller. Each processor keeps its routing table
and tackles a certain number of flows. In order to tolerate
individual processor failures within the distributed virtual
centralized controller system, we can adopt the Paxos protocols
[26]. In fact, the B4 architecture [9], a world wide large scale
SDN data center network built by Google, also adopts the
concept of virtual centralized controller by clustering their
networks to deal with millions of flows traversing the Google’s
data centers. By embracing these techniques to solve the scala-
bility problem, AccFlow can be deployed in real networks. We
present a straightforward deployment architecture in Figure 13.
We consider deploying AccFlow on both core routers and
border routers. Typically, border routers are responsible for
dealing with the inter-domain flows such as BGP sessions
[27] whereas core routers are carrying the traffic across the
AS and may execute a particular traffic engineering policy
such as MPLS [28]. Consider the situation where a remote
legitimate client and the attacker are sending their traffic to
the AS through an undeployed border router R1. Since the
attacking flow D exhausts the bandwidth of the victim border
router R1, the client’s flow A is throttled to zero throughput
(flow A is not able to traverse R1 in Figure 13). Attacking
flow D continues to propagate in the AS until it counters a
deployed core router R2 which drops its packets to save the
network resources for the legitimate flow C (attacking flow D
is not able to traverse R2 in Figure 13). When the AS deploys
AccFlow on its border router R3, it protects the inter-domain
traffic B from being attacked so that B can safely enter the
AS. Apart from launching inter-domain attacks, the attacker
can also compromise the nodes within the AS to generate
local DoS attacking flows, such as the attacking flow E. The
deployed core router R4 can protect the network from such an
attack. Also the deployed routers can stop the local attacking
flows from leaving the AS to attack remote sites. To sum up,
AccFlow is compatible with the existing security protocols and
is incrementally deployable without disruption to the existing
network infrastructure.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we develop the AccFlow, an incrementally
deployable SDN-based protocol, to serve as a countermeasure
against both the low-rate TCP DoS attack and general DoS
attacks in WSN. The main idea of AccFlow is to make the
attacking flows accountable for the congestion by dropping
their packets according to their loss rates. We test the effec-
tiveness of AccFlow under four major simulation setups. In
the first setup, attackers launch low-rate TCP DoS attacks at
different scales and data rates. In the second setup, attackers
vary their strategies by maliciously creating excessive numbers
of short TCP flows to occupy the network resources. The third
setup is designed to study the impact of AccFlow on benign
flows. Finally, in the fourth setup, attackers are launching the
general DoS attacks by continuously generating traffic without
pause. Through substantial amounts of simulations in each
setup, we demonstrate that AccFlow, which does not cause
any performance degradation to benign flows, can effectively
defend against both the low-rate TCP DoS attack and the
general DoS attacks even if attackers are able to vary their
strategies. Finally, we discuss the scalability of AccFlow and
its deployment in real networks.
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Fig. 2: Effectiveness of the low-rate TCP DoS attack.
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Fig. 8: ULR of each flow under distributed DoS attack.
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Fig. 10: AccFlow effectively defends against the SSTF attack.
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Fig. 11: AccFlow harmoniously coexists with the benign periodic
flow and normal flows without causing performance degradation.
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Fig. 12: AccFlow provides a strong defense against the general DoS attacks.
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